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JWT Validation with KrakenD API Gateway

Document updated on May 23, 2023

Protect endpoints from public usage by validating JWT tokens generated by any industry-standard OpenID Connect (OIDC) integration.

Before digging any further, here are some answers to frequently asked questions:

  1. KrakenD does not generate the tokens itself. Still, you can plug it into any SaaS or self-hosted OpenID Identity Provider (IdP) using industry standards (e.g., Auth0, Azure AD, Google Firebase, Keycloak, etc.)

  2. KrakenD does not need to validate all calls using your IdP. KrakenD validates every incoming call’s signature and it doesn’t make token introspection (asking for the IdP data about the token owner).

  3. If you don’t have an identity server, you can still use your classic monolith/backend login system and adapt it to return a JWT payload (a simple JSON). From here, let KrakenD sign the token for you and start using tokens immediately.

  4. Your self-hosted identity server doesn’t need to be exposed to the Internet, as it can live behind KrakenD and let the token generation requests be proxied through KrakenD.

  5. I have tokens generated by the provider XYZ, are they supported? Yes. We still need to find a single major provider that doesn’t follow the JSON Web Encryption (RFC 7516), JSON Web Signature (RFC 7515), or JSON Web Token (RFC 7519) specifications.

  6. If you are new to JWT validation, start reading the JSON Web Tokens overview

JWT header requirements

When KrakenD decodes the base64 token string passed in the Bearer or a cookie, it expects to find in its header section the following fields:

{
    "alg": "RS256",
    "kid": "MDNGMjU2M0U3RERFQUEwOUUzQUMwQ0NBN0Y1RUY0OEIxNTRDM0IxMw"
}

The alg and kid values depend on your implementation, but they must be present.

Important!

Make sure you are declaring the right kid in your JWT. Paste a token in a debugger to find out.

The value provided in the kid must match with the kid declared at the jwk_url or jwk_local_path.

The example above used this public key. Notice how the kid matches the single key present in the JWK document and the token header.

KrakenD is built with security in mind and uses JWS (instead of plain JWT or JWE), and the kid points to the right key in the JWS. This is why this entry is mandatory to validate your tokens.

Basic JWT validation

The JWT validation must be present inside every endpoint definition needing it. If several endpoints are going to require JWT validation, consider using the flexible configuration to avoid repetitive declarations.

Enable the JWT validation by adding the namespace "auth/validator" inside the extra_config of the desired endpoint. Do not forget to add caching.

For instance, to protect the endpoint /protected/resource:

{
    "endpoint": "/protected/resource",
    "extra_config": {
        "auth/validator": {
            "alg": "RS256",
            "audience": ["http://api.example.com"],
            "roles_key": "http://api.example.com/custom/roles",
            "roles": ["user", "admin"],
            "jwk_url": "https://albert-test.auth0.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
            "cache": true
        }
    },
    "backend": [
        {
        "url_pattern": "/"
        }
    ]
}

This configuration makes sure that:

  • The signature of the token matches with the keys under the JWK URL
  • The key from the identity server is cached to avoid hammering it
  • The token is well-formed and didn’t expire
  • The token has a valid signature
  • The role of the user is either user or admin (taken from a key in the JWT payload named http://api.example.com/custom/roles)
  • The token is not revoked in the bloom filter (see revoking tokens)

JWT validation settings

The following settings are available for JWT validation. There are many options, although generally only the fields alg and jwk_url or jwk_local_path are mandatory, and the rest of the keys can be added or not at your best convenience or depending on other options.

These options are for the extra_config’s namespace "auth/validator" placed in every endpoint (use flexible configuration to avoid code repetition):

Fields of JWT validator "auth/validator"
* required fields
Minimum configuration needs one of: alg + jwk_local_path , or alg + jwk_url
alg

string
The hashing algorithm used by the token issuer.
Possible values are: "EdDSA" , "HS256" , "HS384" , "HS512" , "RS256" , "RS384" , "RS512" , "ES256" , "ES384" , "ES512" , "PS256" , "PS384" , "PS512"
Defaults to "RS256"
audience

array
Reject tokens that do not contain ALL audiences declared in the list.
Example: "audience1"
cache

boolean
Set this value to true (recommended) to stop downloading keys on every request and store them in memory for the next cache_duration period and avoid hammering the key server, as recommended for performance. Do not use this flag when using jwk_local_ca.
Defaults to false
cache_duration

integer
The cache duration in seconds when the cache is enabled. 15 minutes when unset.
Defaults to 900
cipher_suites

array
Override the default cipher suites. Use it if you want to enforce an even higher security standard.
Defaults to [49199,49195,49200,49196,52392,52393]

string
Add the key name of the cookie containing the token when it is not passed in the headers
Example: "cookie_jwt"
cypher_key

string
The cyphering key.
disable_jwk_security

boolean
When true, disables security of the JWK client and allows insecure connections (plain HTTP) to download the keys. Useful for development environments.
Defaults to false
issuer

string
When set, tokens not matching the issuer are rejected.
Example: "issuer"
jwk_fingerprints

array
A list of fingerprints (the certificate’s unique identifier) for certificate pinning and avoid man-in-the-middle attacks. Add fingerprints in base64 format.
jwk_local_ca

string
Path to the CA’s certificate verifying a secure connection when downloading the JWK. Use when not recognized by the system (e.g., self-signed certificates).
jwk_local_path

string
Local path to the JWK public keys, has preference over jwk_url. Instead of pointing to an external URL (with jwk_url), public keys are kept locally, in a plain JWK file (security alert!), or encrypted. When encrypted, also add secret_url and cypher_key.
Example: "./jwk.txt"
jwk_url

string
The URL to the JWK endpoint with the public keys used to verify the token’s authenticity and integrity. Use with cache to avoid re-downloading the key on every request. Consider enabling shared caching too. The identity server will receive an HTTP(s) request from KrakenD with a KrakenD user agent, and the identity server must reply with a JSON object and a content-type application/jwk-set+json or application/json.
Example: "https://some-domain.auth0.com/.well-known/jwks.json" , "http://KEYCLOAK:8080/auth/realms/master/protocol/openid-connect/certs" , "https://yourOktaBaseUrl/v1/keys"
key_identify_strategy

string
Allows strategies other than kid to load keys.
Possible values are: "kid" , "x5t" , "kid_x5t"
operation_debug

boolean
When true, any JWT validation operation gets printed in the log with a level ERROR. You will see if a client does not have sufficient roles, the allowed claims, scopes, and other useful information.
Defaults to false
propagate_claims

array
Enables passing claims in the backend’s request header. You can pass nested claims using the dot . operator. E.g.: realm_access.roles.
roles

array
When set, the JWT token not having at least one of the listed roles is rejected.
roles_key

string
When validating users through roles, provide the key name inside the JWT payload that lists their roles. If this key is nested inside another object, add roles_key_is_nested and use the dot notation . to traverse each level. E.g.: resource_access.myclient.roles represents the payload {resource_access: { myclient: { roles: ["myrole"] } }. Notice that the roles object you choose is a list, not a map.
Example: "resource_access.myclient.roles"
roles_key_is_nested

boolean
If the roles key uses a nested object using the . dot notation, you must set it to true to traverse the object.
scopes

array
A list of scopes to validate. Make sure to use a list [] in the config, but when passing the token, the scopes should be separated by spaces, e.g.: "my_scopes": "resource1:action1 resource3:action7".
scopes_key

string
The key name where KrakenD can find the scopes. The key can be a nested object using the . dot notation, e.g.: data.access.my_scopes.
scopes_matcher

string
Defines if the user needs to have in its token at least one of the listed claims (any), or all of them.
Possible values are: "any" , "all"
Defaults to "any"
secret_url

string
An URL with a custom scheme using one of the supported providers (e.g.: awskms://keyID) (see providers).
Example: "base64key://smGbjm71Nxd1Ig5FS0wj9SlbzAIrnolCz9bQQ6uAhl4=" , "awskms://keyID" , "azurekeyvault://keyID" , "gcpkms://projects/[PROJECT_ID]/locations/[LOCATION]/keyRings/[KEY_RING]/cryptoKeys/[KEY]" , "hashivault://keyID"

Here there is an example using an external jwk_url:

{
    "endpoint": "/foo",
    "extra_config": {
        "auth/validator": {
            "alg": "RS256",
            "jwk_url": "https://url/to/jwks.json",
            "cache": true,
            "audience": [
                "audience1"
            ],
            "roles_key": "department",
            "roles_key_is_nested": false,
            "roles": [
                "sales",
                "development"
            ],
            "scopes_key": "my_scopes",
            "scopes_matcher": "any",
            "scopes": [
                "resource1:action1",
                "resource2:action1",
                "resource1:action2"
            ],
            "issuer": "http://my.api.com",
            "cookie_key": "TOKEN",
            "disable_jwk_security": true,
            "jwk_fingerprints": [
                "S3Jha2VuRCBpcyB0aGUgYmVzdCBnYXRld2F5LCBhbmQgeW91IGtub3cgaXQ=="
            ],
            "cipher_suites": [
                10, 47, 53
            ],
            "operation_debug": true
    }
}
}
Performance considerations
If you use cryptographic algorithms that require high computation such as RS512, make sure your KrakenD instances have a proper CPU setting. Additionally, enable cache to avoid hammering your identity servers and save internal network traffic.

Caching keys

A crucial decision when using JWT is defining a caching strategy that works with your key rotation policy.

If you don’t set any caching option, KrakenD will default to the more pessimistic scenario where you rotate the keys continuously, and KrakenD needs to download the keys in the JWK URL every single time. In most cases, this option will add a lot of pressure to your identity server. Therefore, we encourage you to enable cache in each endpoint, and even better if you add the second-level shared cache in the JWK client with shared_cache_duration. For instance:

{
    "version": 3,
    "extra_config": {
        "auth/jwk-client": {
            "@comment": "Enable a JWK shared cache amongst all endpoints of 15 minutes",
            "shared_cache_duration": 900
        }
    },
    "endpoints": [{
      "endpoint": "/protected",
      "extra_config": {
        "auth/validator": {
            "cache": true,
            "cache_duration": 3600,
            "@comment": "Rest of the validator options omitted for simplicity"
        }
      }
    }]
}

Read more about JWK caching

Validation process

KrakenD does the following validation to let users hit protected endpoints:

  • The jwk_url must be accessible by KrakenD at all times (caching is recommended)
  • The token is well formed
  • The kid in the header is listed in the jwk_url or jwk_local_path.
  • The content of the JWK Keys (k) is base64 urlencoded
  • The algorithm alg is supported by KrakenD and matches exactly the one used in the endpoint definition.
  • The token hasn’t expired
  • The signature is valid.
  • The given issuer matches (if present in the configuration), and is a string
  • The given audience matches (if present in the configuration), and is a string
  • The given claims are within the endpoint accepted roles (if present in the configuration))
  • All numeric claims checking is represented as a float64 (decimal).

The configuration allows you to define the set of required roles. For example, a user who passes a token with roles A and B, can access an endpoint requiring "roles": ["A","C"] as it has one of the required options (A).

If the token is expired, the configuration inside the namespace is incorrect, the signature doesn’t match, the required claims do not match, or the token is revoked, a 401 Unauthorized is returned.

When the token doesn’t include the defined ACL’s required roles, a 403 Forbidden is returned.

When you generate tokens for end-users, make sure to set a low expiration. Tokens are supposed to have short lives and should expire in a few minutes or hours.

Accepted providers for encrypting payloads

When using a jwk_local_path, the secret_url scheme accepts different providers:

Local secrets

The local secrets require an URL with the following scheme:

base64key://base64UrlEncondedContent

The URL host must be base64 url encoded and must decode to exactly 32 bytes. Here is an example of the extra_config:

{
    "jwk_local_path":"./jwk.txt",
    "secret_url":"base64key://smGbjm71Nxd1Ig5FS0wj9SlbzAIrnolCz9bQQ6uAhl4=",
    "cypher_key":"gCERmfqHMoEu3+utqBa/R1oMZYIvh0OOKtJmnX/hDPDxbXCGXGvO3SF7B5FWxrJnRW7rnjGIV4eP2VLrYX2q9pJM49BpP+A9"
}

This config will use the key smGbjm71Nxd1Ig5FS0wj9SlbzAIrnolCz9bQQ6uAhl4= for decrypting de cypher_key (base64 standard enconded) and then decrypting the content of the file ./jwt.txt.

See this test to understand how to generate and encrypt payloads.

Amazon KMS

awskms://keyID

The URL Host + Path is used as the key ID, which can be an Amazon Resource Name (ARN), alias name, or alias ARN. Note that ARNs may contain “:” characters, which cannot be escaped in the Host part of a URL, so you should use the awskms:///<ARN> form.

More information about AWS KMS

Azure’s Key Vault

azurekeyvault://keyID

The credentials are taken from the environment unless the AZURE_KEYVAULT_AUTH_VIA_CLI environment variable is set to true, in which case it uses the az command line.

More information about Azure Key Vault

Google Cloud KMS

gcpkms://projects/[PROJECT_ID]/locations/[LOCATION]/keyRings/[KEY_RING]/cryptoKeys/[KEY]

You can take the URL from the GCP console.

Hashicorp’s Vault

hashivault://keyID

Environment variables VAULT_SERVER_URL and VAULT_SERVER_TOKEN are used.

Passing claims to the backend URL

Since KrakenD 1.2.0, it is possible to use data present in the claims to inject it into the backend’s final URL. The notation of the url_pattern field includes the parsing of {JWT.some_claim}, where some_claim is an attribute of your claim.

For instance, when your JWT payload is represented by something like this:

{
    "sub": "1234567890",
    "name": "Mr. KrakenD"
}

Having a backend defined with:

{
    "url_pattern": "/foo/{JWT.sub}",
    "method": "POST"
}

The call to your backend would produce the request:

POST /foo/1234567890

Keep in mind that this syntax in the url_pattern field is only available if the backend loads the extra_config "auth/validator" and that it does not work with nested attributes in the payload.

If KrakenD can’t replace the claim’s content for any reason, the backend receives a request to the literal URL /foo/{JWT.sub}.

Propagate JWT claims as request headers

It is possible to forward claims in a JWT as request headers. It is a common use case to have, for instance, the sub claim added as an X-User header to the request. The propagation makes that other KrakenD components, such as rate-limiting, can work with information in the token.

Important: The endpoint input_headers needs to be set as well, so the backend can see it.

{
    "extra_config": {
        "auth/validator": {
            "propagate_claims": [
                ["sub", "x-user"],
                ["realm_access.role", "x-role"]
            ]
        }
    }
}

In this case, the sub claim’s value will be added as x-user header to the request. If the claim does not exist, the mapping is just skipped.

In addition, the nested property role (inside realm_access) is passed as an x-role header.

A complete running example

The KrakenD Playground demonstrates how to protect endpoints using JWT and includes two examples ready to use:

  • Integration with an external third party using a Single Page Application from Auth0
  • Integration with an internal identity provider service (mocked) using a symmetric key algorithm and a signer middleware.

To try it, clone the playground and follow the README.

Supported hashing algorithms and cipher suites

Hashing algorithms

Accepted values for the alg field are:

  • EdDSA: EdDSA
  • HS256: HMAC using SHA-256
  • HS384: HMAC using SHA-384
  • HS512: HMAC using SHA-512
  • RS256: RSASSA-PKCS-v1.5 using SHA-256
  • RS384: RSASSA-PKCS-v1.5 using SHA-384
  • RS512: RSASSA-PKCS-v1.5 using SHA-512
  • ES256: ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256
  • ES384: ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384
  • ES512: ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512
  • PS256: RSASSA-PSS using SHA256 and MGF1-SHA256
  • PS384: RSASSA-PSS using SHA384 and MGF1-SHA384
  • PS512: RSASSA-PSS using SHA512 and MGF1-SHA512

Cipher suites

Accepted values for cipher suites are:

  • 5: TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
  • 10: TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  • 47: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  • 53: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  • 60: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
  • 156: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  • 157: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • 49159: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
  • 49161: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  • 49162: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  • 49169: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
  • 49170: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  • 49171: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  • 49172: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  • 49187: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
  • 49191: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256

Default suites are:

  • 49199: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  • 49195: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  • 49200: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • 49196: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • 52392: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
  • 52393: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
Scarf

Unresolved issues?

The documentation is only a piece of the help you can get! Whether you are looking for Open Source or Enterprise support, see more support channels that can help you.

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